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Introduction 
 
This Policy Brief is focused on the need to reduce macroeconomic imbalances both globally and 
within Europe. In doing so, it employs the CAM global macroeconometric model to make 
projections of trends over roughly the next ten years, i.e., through 2025.  
This effort follows the pattern established in previous joint FEPS-CDPR Policy Briefs. These have 
included Policy Briefs disseminated in August 2013 and November 2014, which have been 
published by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies. 
In examining global imbalances, this Policy Brief focuses on trends in two key economic variables: 
GDP growth rates and current-account balances as a ratio to GDP. 
At the global level, it examines these two variables for the four most economically important 
countries/blocs: the USA, Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the European Union.  
Within the European Union it focuses on the same variables for the Core Eurozone (which groups 
together such countries as Austria, Germany and the Netherlands), the Eurozone Periphery (which 
groups together such countries as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the two major countries 
of France and the United Kingdom. 
 
The Baseline Scenario: Global Imbalances 
 
As in past efforts, we compare the results of a ‘Baseline’ Scenario (in which we assume minimal 
changes in policy) with an ‘Alternative’ Scenario (in which we explicitly program a set of 
progressive policy changes).  
In view of the current plight of Greece and, more broadly, the continuing stagnation in economic 
growth and the heavy debt burdens of many countries within the European Union, the 
programming for our ‘Alternative’ Scenario might look exceedingly ambitious. Yet its guiding 
motivation is to identify what ‘realistically’ has to be done in order to set Europe, as well as the 
global economy, on a more sustainable economic trajectory.  
At the end of this Policy Brief we will review the effects of these two scenarios on the debt burden 
of the Eurozone Periphery. Even under the Alternative Scenario this burden would remain onerous: 
the debt stock would still stand at about 140% of GDP. Hence, debt relief should have been a 
central component of any EU-wide programme to prevent Greece from defaulting and allowing it 
to remain a viable member of the Eurozone. 
We start our Policy Brief with a description of some of the important economic trends projected 
by our Baseline Scenario. Table 1 examines the trends in the current account as a percentage of 
GDP for our four key countries/blocs at the global level.  
It lists historical statistics for 2000, 2007 and 2014, which are provided by the statistical base of 
the CAM model. Then it lists the projected estimates of the current account as a ratio to GDP for 
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the period 2015-2025. This projection is generated by the CAM model and is known as the 
Baseline Scenario.  
This scenario essentially carries forward the basic thrust of historical trends and established 
policies. The latter includes, for example, continuing reductions in both government expenditures 
and revenue. But it should also be noted that for the European Union it includes the additional 
assumption of a mild stimulus to investment, which has been advocated by the recent Juncker plan. 
Table 1 shows that according to the Baseline Scenario there is likely to be an improvement in the 
previously high current-account surpluses in China. While China’s surplus was an astounding 
9.6% of GDP in 2007, it had already been reduced dramatically by 2014 to 1.9%.  
The CAM projection suggests that its current account will drop further, to 1.5% of GDP by 2025. 
This lower level of surplus is tied to China’s increasing dependence on energy imports since its 
domestic production of energy is projected to be outstripped by its energy demand.  
 
Table 1. Current Account (% of GDP), Historical and Baseline Projection 
 Historical Projected 
2000 2007 2014 2025 
China 2.0 9.6 1.9 1.5 
European Union 0.6 -0.5 1.9 1.3 
Japan 2.7 4.5 0.7 3.8 
United States -3.7 -5.1 -2.3 -4.7 
 
In contrast, current-account imbalances are projected to worsen appreciably in the USA and Japan. 
For example, Japan is likely to re-establish the large current-account surpluses that it exhibited 
before the global financial crisis. For instance, in 2007 its surplus was 4.5% of GDP.  
Our projection suggests that Japan’s surplus will rise from a fairly low level in 2014 to reach 3.8% 
by 2025. Its surplus will also be matched by sizeable future surpluses throughout the rest of East 
Asia. 
The USA will have the opposite problem. In 2007 its current-account deficit, as a ratio to GDP, 
was an alarming -5.1%. The ensuing recessionary conditions from 2008 onwards helped to 
moderate this deficit, reducing it to -2.3% in 2014. But its future deficit is projected to rise 
dramatically, reaching an ominous -4.7% of GDP in 2025. 
The current account for the European Union has been in surplus since 2007, reaching 1.9% of GDP 
by 2014. This has been due primarily to the large surplus created by Germany and secondarily by 
some small surpluses created in the Eurozone Periphery, largely brought about by the depression 
of domestic aggregate demand.  
The Baseline Scenario suggests that the current account surplus for the European Union as a whole 
will moderate in the future. In 2025, for example, it will stand at 1.3% of GDP. However, this 
aggregate result does not reveal the state of the imbalances within the European Union. 
Hence, despite some apparent improvements, current-account imbalances will continue to be a 
problem for the global economy in the future. The seemingly precarious financial position of the 
USA (even though it will still be the world’s leading reserve-currency country) is particularly 
problematic.  
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The Baseline: Global Trends in Economic Growth 
 
The problem of global imbalances is likely to be compounded by pervasively modest rates of 
global economic growth over the next ten years. For China, the European Union, Japan and the 
USA, Table 2 provides the average historical growth rates for 2000-2008 and 2009-2014 and the 
average projected growth rate over 2015-2025. The table also provides similar statistics for the 
global economy as a whole. 
The CAM projection is fairly optimistic about China’s economic growth in the future. It estimates 
an average rate of 8% (higher than most current predictions). But across the European Union, 
Japan and the USA, growth rates are projected to be well below 2%.  
While such averages represent an improvement over corresponding historical statistics for the 
2009-2014 period of recession and stagnation, they are still well below the healthier rates that 
China experienced during 2000-2008, i.e., before the global financial crisis. 
 
Table 2. Average GDP Growth Rate, Historical and Baseline Projection 
 Historical Projected 
2000-08 2009-14 2015-25 
China 10.5 8.8 8.0 
European Union 2.5 0.2 1.6 
Japan 1.5 0.3 1.1 
United States 2.6 1.2 1.4 
Global 3.4 2.0 2.7 
 
The relatively slow growth rate that the CAM projects for 2015-2025 for the USA (namely, only 
1.4%) is particularly worrying, especially since it is currently being touted as one of the main 
engines for global growth. Its projected growth for the next decade would be, for example, well 
below its 2.6% average growth during 2000-2008. 
There is projected to be a similar problem for both the European Union and Japan. The EU’s 
projected growth rate during 2015-2025 would be only 1.6% whereas the corresponding rate that 
it achieved during 2000-2008 was 2.5%. 
Hence, despite the anomaly of the projected robust growth maintained by China, the global 
economy is expected to grow by only 2.7% over the next ten years. While certainly a welcome 
improvement over its relatively low 2% growth rate during 2009-2014 (in the wake of the global 
financial crisis), the rate achieved by the global economy during the earlier period of 2000-2008 
was a much healthier 3.4%. 
The quick review above of the continuing current-account imbalances and relatively slow 
economic growth that the CAM projects for the next ten years suggests that policymakers need to 
prioritise identifying policy alternatives that could substantially improve conditions in the global 
economy as well as within major regions and countries. Our particular concern is identifying 
policies that could improve economic conditions within the European Union. 
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Framing an Alternative Policy Scenario 
 
In order to frame an alternative policy scenario that could significantly improve on the 
unsatisfactory projected outcomes from the CAM’s Baseline Scenario, we program changes in a 
number of important policy variables. This set of changes will frame the basis for projections by 
an Alternative Scenario, both for the global economy and for blocs and countries within the 
European Union. 
Primarily for countries in the European Union but also for the USA, we set floors on the reduction 
in government expenditures as a ratio to GDP. For the most part, these floors are designed to 
maintain current post-crisis levels of public expenditures. Without them, austerity measures (such 
as the currently planned radical cuts in welfare in the United Kingdom) would intensify the 
downward pressure on aggregate demand.  
In the Eurozone Periphery, however, we assume—as a minor boost to aggregate demand—a small 
increase in the level of government expenditures. Though this is meant to be a counter-weight to 
continuing austerity, the resultant level will still be well below its historical peak before the global 
financial crisis. 
Setting such floors contrasts with the Baseline Scenario, under which government expenditures 
are projected to continue declining, contributing thereby to further economic stagnation.  
As mentioned earlier, the Baseline Scenario already incorporates modest increases in investment 
in the European Union, which is modelled on the Juncker plan. In contrast, the Alternative 
Scenario programs significant additional increases in investment.  
Within Europe, the aim is to increase investment to 20% of GDP—such as in France, the Core 
Eurozone and even in the Eurozone Periphery. In the United Kingdom, where investment as a ratio 
to GDP has remained abysmally low, programming seeks, more modestly, to raise it above 18%.  
Such a general initiative across the European Union could be financed by the European Investment 
Bank, which is able to issue bonds on the capital market for such purposes. 
In Japan and the USA, the CAM programming seeks to increase investment as a ratio to GDP to 
22%. Such programming should help drive increases in aggregate demand and, also importantly, 
boost aggregate supply and productivity. 
Concomitantly, the Alternative Scenario programs a boost in private savings as a ratio to GDP in 
the USA, in order to counter the negative impact of excessive domestic aggregate demand on its 
large and growing current-account deficit.  
However, in the Core Eurozone, where large current-account surpluses are the primary problem, 
a decrease in private savings (and a concomitant increase in consumption) is programmed. Such 
an increase in consumption could be driven by increasing wages, such as through government 
boosts to the minimum wage. 
Lastly, in countries and blocs where current-account deficits pose persistent problems, the 
Alternative Scenario targets decreases in the nominal exchange rate, as a basis to bring down the 
real exchange rate.  
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This programming applies, within Europe, to France, the Eurozone Periphery and, especially, the 
United Kingdom. In the European Union quantitative easing by the European Central Bank has 
already begun to have such an effect across the Eurozone.  
Central Banks or the Governments in the United Kingdom and the USA will have to devise 
measures to have a similar effect on devaluing the Pound and the Dollar, respectively. Both 
countries are facing the formidable threat of rising current-account deficits. 
In contrast, where large current-account surpluses could pose future problems, such as in Japan 
and other countries in East Asia, the Alternative Scenario programs an increase in the real 
exchange rate. However, no targeting of the real exchange rate is applied to China since its current-
account surplus is projected by the Baseline Scenario to remain historically low. 
 
 
Alternative Scenario: Global GDP Growth  
 
What is the effect of the policy-related programming outlined above? First, we review the 
projected outcomes for the period 2015-2025 for the global economy and major blocs/countries 
within it. 
Table 3 shows the results, from both the Baseline Scenario and the Alternative Scenario, for the 
growth of GDP for the global economy and, within it, for China, the European Union, Japan and 
the United States. 
Table 3. Average GDP growth, Baseline and Alternative Scenarios 
 2015-2025 
Baseline  
scenario 
Alternative  
scenario 
China 8.0 8.7 
European Union 1.6 3.8 
Japan 1.1 1.2 
United States 1.4 3.4 
Global Economy 2.7 4.0 
 
While the projected growth of the global economy would be only 2.7% in the Baseline Scenario, 
it would rise to 4% in the Alternative Scenario. Benefiting indirectly from policy changes in other 
countries and blocs, China’s GDP growth would rise marginally, from 8% to 8.7%. This would be 
aided mainly by increased growth in both its investment and exports. 
In both the European Union and the USA (where the Alternative Scenario has concentrated its 
programming), economic growth would improve substantially. In the EU, growth would increase 
to 3.8%; and in the USA, it would rise to 3.4%. The projected results show that USA’s growth 
would be prompted by a revival in government expenditures as well as significant increases in 
investment. 
However, in Japan, despite the programmed changes in policy in the Alternative Scenario, the 
growth rate of GDP would barely budge, rising from 1.1% to only 1.2%.  
In other words, its propensity to ‘secular stagnation’ appears to be impervious to the policy 
initiatives that have been programmed. The Scenario outputs show that during 2015-2015 the 
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growth rate of consumer expenditures would decline by half and investment would slow markedly 
later in the ten-year period. 
Thus, even though some countries and blocs would improve their economic conditions and the 
global economy would grow much more quickly, problems would persist in Japan—and, arguably, 
in China as well since its continuing rapid economic growth (heavily dependent on investment and 
exports of manufactures) is not likely to be sustainable. 
 
Alternative Scenario: Current-Account Balances  
 
What is the effect of the programming in the Alternative Scenario on current-account balances for 
major blocs and countries across the globe? And how does this outcome compare to that for the 
Baseline Scenario? 
For China, there appears to be very little difference across the two global scenarios (see Table 4). 
In the Baseline Scenario its current account as a ratio to GDP would be 1.5% by 2025 and in the 
Alternative Scenario it would be 1.3%. The main factor holding back an increase in its current-
account balance is the rise in its deficit on energy, which would cancel out much of its continuing 
surplus on manufactures. 
In the European Union there will also be a small decline in its aggregate current account. While in 
the Baseline Scenario its surplus would be 1.3% of GDP, in the Alternative Scenario it would be 
1.0%. 
Table 4. Current Account (% of GDP), Baseline and Alternative Scenarios 
 2025 
Baseline Scenario Alternative Scenario 
China 1.5 1.3 
European Union 1.3 1.0 
Japan 3.8 2.3 
United States -4.7 -3.7 
 
In Japan, however, there would be a significant reduction in its current-account surplus under the 
Alternative Scenario. While its current-account surplus would be 3.8% of GDP under the Baseline 
Scenario, it would fall to 2.3% under the Alternative Scenario. In the rest of East Asia there would 
also be substantial reductions in current-account surpluses. 
Importantly, the current-account deficit of the USA would also improve under the Alternative 
Scenario. While its deficit would be -4.7% of GDP in 2025 under the Baseline Scenario, this ratio 
would fall to -3.7% under the Alternative Scenario. This decline is projected to be aided by a 
diminishing dependence on energy imports. 
Though there will not be a dramatic decline in the US deficit, this drop should still lead to a more 
manageable external position, which could have important concomitant benefits for the world 
economy as a whole.  
 
 
The Impact on Europe of the Two Scenarios  
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In this section of the Policy Brief we compare the effects of both the Baseline Scenario and the 
Alternatives Scenario on blocs and major countries within the European Union. These include the 
Core Eurozone, the Eurozone Periphery, France and the United Kingdom. 
 
Economic Growth 
 
Table 5 shows the rate of economic growth for these four blocs/countries for the projected period 
of 2015-2025 for both the Baseline Scenario and the Alternative Scenario. 
The Baseline Scenario projects that in the Core Eurozone (led by Germany) economic growth will 
achieve a 1.9% average over the next decade. In contrast, the Alternative Scenario projects a 
healthier average economic growth of 4%.  
The differences in projections are similar for the Eurozone Periphery (led by Italy and Spain and 
including Greece and Portugal). While the Baseline Scenario projects only 1.2% average economic 
growth, the Alternative Scenario projects 4.1%. 
 
Table 5. Average GDP growth, Baseline and Alternative Scenarios 
 2015-2025 
Baseline  
scenario 
Alternative  
scenario 
Core Eurozone 1.9 4.0 
Eurozone Periphery 1.2 4.1 
France 0.5 3.0 
United Kingdom 1.4 3.6 
 
There are also striking differences between the two scenarios on projections of economic growth 
for France and the United Kingdom. For France the difference is 0.5% versus 3% growth during 
2015-2025. For the United Kingdom the difference is 1.4% versus 3.6%.  
However, it should be noted that these impressive results are due to programmed policy changes 
not only within the European Union but also within other major countries within the global 
economy, especially the USA. 
 
Current Account Balance 
 
Compared to the current-account balances projected for 2025 by the Baseline Scenario, those 
projected by the Alternative Scenario are mostly a clear improvement.  
These differing outcomes are presented in Table 6. It shows that the Baseline Scenario projects 
stark imbalances within the European Union in 2025.  
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Table 6. Current Account (% of GDP), Baseline and Alternative Scenarios 
 2025 
Baseline  
scenario 
Alternative  
scenario 
Core Eurozone 5.6 1.8 
Eurozone Periphery -0.5 -0.1 
France -2.9 -1.8 
United Kingdom -7.0 -2.8 
 
For example, the Core Eurozone would enjoy a current-account surplus of 5.6% of GDP in 2025 
while the UK would suffer from an appalling current-account deficit of -7.0%. In 2014, in contrast, 
the UK’s current-account deficit had been much smaller, i.e., -2.8%. 
In addition, France would have to suffer from a current-account deficit of -2.9% under the Baseline 
Scenario. This would represent a discernible deterioration from its deficit of -2.2% in 2014. 
In contrast, the Eurozone Periphery would have a current-account deficit of only -0.5% in 2025. 
But the chief explanation for this outcome would be its concomitant slow 1.2% rate of economic 
growth and the savage depression of its aggregate demand after the global financial crisis that had 
already painfully transformed its -7.6% deficit in 2008 into a 0.6% surplus in 2014. 
 
The Alternative Scenario 
The Alternative Scenario would have some notable successes in minimizing stark imbalances in 
the current accounts of countries and blocs within the European Union.  
For example, in contrast to the large surplus of 5.6% in 2025 for the Core Eurozone under the 
Baseline Scenario, the Alternative Scenario projects only a 1.8% surplus. While the Core Eurozone 
would benefit from decreasing dependence on energy imports, the dramatic drop in its exports of 
manufactures would be the principal factor reducing its current account surplus. 
Moreover, whereas the United Kingdom would have to deal with a daunting deficit on its current 
account of -7% of GDP in 2025 under the Baseline Scenario, it would face only a -2.8% deficit 
under the Alternative Scenario.  
While the UK’s surplus on the export of services would hold up, it would still have a deficit on 
energy and a sizeable deficit on manufactures. Nevertheless, its external vulnerability would still 
be more manageable under the Alternative Scenario. 
France is also projected to enjoy a significant comparative drop in its current-account deficit in 
2025, i.e., from -2.9% to -1.8%. The depreciation of the euro would certainly help but this trend 
would be aided by a significant decline in its deficit on energy. 
Also, under the Alternative Scenario, the current account of the Eurozone Periphery would almost 
be in balance, at -0.1%. But its significant deficit on income and transfers (namely, about -2% of 
GDP) would continue. This would be offset, however, by continuing surpluses on manufactures. 
So the current accounts of the European Union would become more manageable as a result of the 
Alternative Scenario. The deficits of France and the United Kingdom would be substantially 
reduced while the large surplus of the Core Eurozone (led by Germany) would markedly decline. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This Policy Brief has used the CAM global macroeconometric model to program a set of policy 
initiatives that could address imbalances both in the global economy and in the European Union.  
Our programming, which we have identified as an Alternative Scenario, has primarily involved 
setting floors on government expenditures, significantly boosting investment and targeting 
decreases in real exchange rates. This scenario has been relatively successful in reducing current-
account imbalances while increasing the growth rates of GDP.  
At the global level GDP growth would remain high in China and increase significantly in the USA 
and the EU. But growth would still remain low in Japan. 
Current–account surpluses would be only marginally decreased in China and the European Union. 
More importantly, the substantial surplus of Japan would be reduced and the perilous deficit of the 
USA (which could contribute to destabilizing the global economy) would be contained.  
Within the European Union, the growth rates of GDP would increase significantly across the 
board, to 3%-4%. In contrast, under the Baseline Scenario growth rates would range only from 
0.5% to 1.9%. 
EU current-account imbalances would also be reduced across the board. In particular, the high 
5.6% surplus of the Core Eurozone would be reduced to only 1.8%; and the perilously large -7% 
deficit of the United Kingdom would be reined in to a more manageable level of -2.8%. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Government Debt as a % of GDP: The Baseline and Alternative Scenarios 
 
 
Yet it is important to note that the more favourable outcomes projected for the European Union 
would not have solved some of its more intractable problems. Figure 1 illustrates, for example, 
the results for the debt stock as a ratio to GDP for the Eurozone Periphery.  
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Under the Baseline Scenario, this bloc’s debt stock would mercilessly and inexorably approach 
200% of GDP by 2025. Clearly this would be a painfully unsustainable outcome. In contrast, under 
the Alternative Scenario, this ratio would stay below 140%. Though a significant improvement by 
comparison, this latter outcome would still not be favourable. 
These results provide a useful perspective on the inability of the EU to address the most pressing 
problems of member states such as Greece. Continuing austerity would certainly not rectify 
Greece’s problems, for instance. And even a significant upturn in economic growth would not 
suffice. Instead it is crucial that substantial debt relief is brought forward and put at the centre of 
any efforts to keep Greece solvent and a continuing viable member of the European Union. 
In the midst of the grave crisis precipitated by Greece’s understandable inability to repay its 
international debts, it is imperative that EU policymakers identify more ambitious and indeed more 
progressive solutions to the EU’s current prolonged malaise. This Policy Brief has tried to make a 
modest contribution to the debate on how EU might begin to do so. 
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